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Abstract—A social choice procedure is modeled as a repeated
Nash game between the social agents, who are communicating
with each other through a social communication network mod-
eled by an undirected graph. The agents’ criteria for this game
are describing a trade off between self-consistent and manipula-
tive behaviors. Their best response strategies are resulting in two
dynamics rules, one for the agents’ opinions and one for their
actions. The stability properties of these dynamics are studied. In
the case of instability, the stabilization of these dynamics through
the design of the network topology is formulated as a constrained
integer programming problem. The constraints have the form of
a Bilinear Matrix Inequality (BMI), which is known to result in
a nonconvex feasible set in the general case. To deal with this
problem a Genetic Algorithm is designed. Finally, simulations are
presented for several different initial topologies and conclusions
are derived concerning both the functionality of the algorithm
and the advisability of the problem formulation.
Index Terms—Opinion dynamics, Nash game, Network’s topol-
ogy design, Constrained integer programming, Bilinear Matrix
Inequality, Genetic Algorithm
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years great progress has been made in the mathe-matical modeling and study of social phenomena. A topic
of current interest is the study of the evolution of social
agents’ opinions about a certain issue. This is commonly called
opinion dynamics, for which a first model has been proposed
since 1974 by M.De-Groot [1]. Since then, a lot of work has
been done in this field [2]-[11], many interesting cases have
been modeled and analysed, some of which are summarized
in [12], [26], and new ideas continue to be proposed and
studied up to now [13]-[16]. The burst of interest in this area
is due to the emerging new questions that a decentralised but
interconnected system modeling and analysis poses in many
fields.
However, from a sociological point of view, as in the case of
our references, an underlying assumption is usually important
for the justification of the study of these dynamics. This
assumption states that if the opinions of the members of a
society are known along with their dynamics, we can predict
their social behavior, or we may even be able to determine this
behavior by affecting the mechanism of the opinion dynamics.
Thus, it is assumed that the agents are consistent and they act
in accordance with their beliefs.
On the other hand, from a game-theoretic perspective the
action of an agent is determined by her criteria as a best
response to the other agents’ actions. This indicates that an
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agent’s action also depends on her neighbors’ actions and not
only on her opinion, which shall be considered as a shaping
characteristic of her criteria. Moreover, this perspective adds
the useful insight that the agents usually act antagonistically to
their neighbors and they are not just affected by them [18]. So,
in this work we develop a model introduced in [16] describing
a social choice procedure, where the population structure
is modeled by an undirected graph and the agents’ actions
depend both on their opinions, which evolve dynamically in
our model, and on their neighbors’ actions.
Specifically, each agent has an internal belief or opinion,
which evolves in time following some opinion shaping mech-
anism deriving from the minimization of a suitable criterion
modeling the tendency of the agent to conform to the public
opinion. Each agent has also an expressed action in the social
choice procedure. Each opinion is mapped to a desired action.
However, the action of each agent isn’t identical to her desired
action but it derives from the minimization of a suitable
criterion modeling the tendency of the agent to manipulate, i.e.
to deviate from her desired action, in order to pull the social
outcome to her favor. The resulting game between the agents
is considered to take place in discrete time steps, where both
the opinion shaping and the action shaping criteria of each
agent retain the same form. So we formulate a repeated game
where we seek for the stagewise Nash strategy profiles. These
strategy profiles are consisted of two dynamic rules, one for
the opinions and one for the actions of the agents.
We study the stability properties of these dynamics and we
deduce a sufficient condition that guarantees the convergence
of the system to a bounded state. This condition implicates the
manipulative tendencies of the agents and the graph structure
with the stability of the system, stating that the acceptable
manipulative behavior of an agent is relative to her social
cohesion and her position in the graph. Simulations are also
presented in order to examine how the opinion and action
dynamics behave over several well known graph structures,
such as random, small world and special structured graphs
and in order to study the resilience of the system when our
sufficient assumption is violated.
Subsequently, we consider the problem of changing the
social network’s topology in order to influence the effects
of manipulative behaviors. The network topology has been
chosen as our designing parameter for two basic reasons. At
first, the network topology design is an emerging problem in
many scientific fields nowadays, such as security [19], UAVs
navigation [21], cyberphysical systems [22], convergence of
mean field games [20], etc. So, a general formulation and
study of a network topology design for the stabilisation of
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2a system of unstable dynamics of interconnected agents can
be applied to many practical problems of current interest.
Secondly, the network topology is a parameter that the social
network’s administrator can affect and thus influence the
agents’ behaviors in an indirect way, that does not raise social
reactions. So, undesirable social phenomena can be avoided.
It must be specified that in our work the term social network
corresponds to its digital realisation and not to its abstract
concept of a representation of human relationships, so an
administrator exists and the topology can be affected. We
would like to note here that in contrast to its practicality
the existence of one or more administrators in such networks
raises the more intriguing question of who will control the
administrators, who have the power to affect the other agents’
manipulability and the final outcome.
Analytically, we study the case of an initial topology
resulting in unstable dynamics and we want to find a new
topology that results in stable dynamics and that is close
to the initial topology with respect to the number and the
exact position of their edges. This problem is formulated as
an integer programming problem with a Lyapunov inequality
for discrete time systems (known also as Schur’s inequality) as
constraint. Each decision variable of this optimisation problem
represent either the existence of an edge between two agents or
one of the components of the Lyapunov matrix. The constraint
is nonlinear with respect to our decision variables and is shown
to be also nonconvex, by the time it can be written as a Bilinear
Matrix Inequality, which is known to be a nonconvex problem
in its general case [23]. To the best of our knowledge, a similar
approach involving nonconvex integer optimisation for the
graph topology design problem does not exist and since it may
arise in many similar design problems when no simplifying
assumptions are considered there is a merit in studying it.
Since no efficient algorithm is known for this type of
problems, we developed a genetic algorithm to deal with it.
This algorithm searches only for the values of the integer
decision variables representing the edges of the graph, while a
Linear Matrix Inequality solver is used to check the feasibility
of each new topology by solving the Lyapunov inequality with
the topology variables fixed, which results to be linear with
respect to the Lyapunov matrix. This procedure is repeated for
many generations, where new topologies are produced by the
application of the genetic operators.
Finally, simulations of the results of the proposed algo-
rithm are presented. The behavior of the algorithm is studied
over several different initial topologies, where the agents’
parameters have been chosen properly to raise instabilities in
the dynamics. Through the examination of these test cases
we derive conclusions on the functionality of the proposed
algorithm and the relevancy of our results with the expected
ones from our empirical perception of social networks and
social choice procedures.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Notation
We consider an undirected graph G=(V,E). By n we denote
the size of the graph or equivalently the number of its vertices.
We denote by Ni the neighborhood of the agent i, Ni = {j :
(i, j) ∈ E} and by di the degree of node i, that is the size
of its neighborhood. Let A be the adjacency matrix of the
graph, it is a n×n symmetric matrix and its (i,j) entry is 1 if
nodes i and j are adjacent to each other and 0 otherwise. Let
D = diag{di} be the diagonal degree matrix, C = diag{ci}
be the diagonal self-confidence matrix and G = diag{gi} be
the diagonal manipulation matrix. The symbol 1 stands for the
n× 1 vector with all his coordinates equal to 1, the symbol I
stands for the identity n × n matrix and the symbols ei, i =
1...n stand for the standard basis of Rn . For a set A we
denote XA its indicator function, XA(x) = 1 if x ∈ A and
XA(x) = 0 elsewhere. The symbolism d·e denotes rounding
to the next natural number and the symbolism d·eeven denotes
rounding to the next even natural number. The symbol AT
stands for the transpose of the matrix A.
B. Derivation of the Opinion Dynamics
At first, the mechanism that determines the evolution of
the agents’ opinions is studied. It is considered that in this
procedure the main factor that shapes the opinions in time is
conformity. That is, the agents’ opinions tend to be affected
and finally conform with their neighbors’ opinions. This model
of opinions’ evolution is well known and studied for many
years [1]-[3], [13]. In fact, in [3], [13] the model has been
enriched with the inclusion of stubborn agents, i.e. people who
insist on their initial beliefs, but since their presence affects
primarily the equilibrium of the opinion dynamics and not their
stability properties, we shall not include such agents in our
model. Following the notation of the aforementioned works,
the opinion of the agent i is denoted by θi(k) at each time step
k, and its value is a real number. Every agent has an initial
opinion θi(0) and she changes her opinion at each time step
according to her stepwise opinion shaping criterion:
Joi(k + 1) =ci(θi(k + 1)− θi(k))2
+ di(θi(k + 1)−
∑
j∈Ni θj(k)
di
)2 (1)
where ci is a factor analogue to the self-confidence of the agent
for her opinion and di, which is the number of her friends, is
assumed to affect her opinion according to the rule that the
more social the agent is the more her opinion is affected by
his peers. In fact, these two measures have no meaning as
absolute values but the fractions cidi+ci and
di
di+ci
indicate the
obstinateness or the volatility of the agent. It shall be pointed
here that in several cases of practical interest where the opinion
shaping procedure is considered very slow, these parameters
should be chosen: cidi+ci >>
di
di+ci
, which will slow down
drastically the rate of convergence of the opinions to the social
average.
By the minimization of the above criteria arise the following
best-response dynamic rule according to which the opinions
evolve in time:
θi(k + 1) =
ci
di + ci
θi(k) +
1
di + ci
∑
j∈Ni
θj(k) (2)
3C. Derivation of the Action Dynamics
In contrast with the opinion shaping criteria, which are
basically modelling a progressive conformity to the average
beliefs, the criteria determining the action of each agent in
every time step depict the tendency of the agents to manipulate
the social outcome to their favor. That is, each agent may
deviate her action from the one dictated by her beliefs in order
to pull the social outcome towards her desired direction. In
other words, as pointed in [15], it is a common phenomenon in
politics that the people who disagree with what they perceive
as the expected social outcome tend to overstate their opinions,
leading their neighbors to misperceptions of the public opinion
and conform to these false estimations, thus pulling the social
outcome to their favor.
A basic aspect of this model is that of the agent’s perception
of the social outcome. For that, it is assumed that the agents
have local information of the other agents’ actions, that is
they know only the actions of their neighbors. Moreover, it is
assumed that this information pattern is Markovian, ie at each
time step they know only the last actions of their neighbors
forgetting the past. According to these two assumptions the
estimated social outcome for each agent is:
u˜i(k) =
∑
j∈Ni uj(k − 1) + ui(k)
di + 1
(3)
where each agent’s action is denoted by ui(k) at each time
step k and its value is a real number.
Remark II.1. If the second assumption is relaxed by adding
memory to the agents, so as to be able to predict the social
outcome based on all the previous actions of their neighbors,
the repeated Nash game examined here will be converted
to a dynamic one, whose analysis is far more difficult yet
interesting, and may be part of a future work.
Based on the aforementioned concepts the criteria that
determine the actions of each agent are dependent on her
current opinion and on her locally estimated social outcome,
so they are defined in each stage as follows:
Jai(θi(k), u1(k − 1)...ui(k)...un(k − 1)) =
(ui(k)− φ(θi(k)))2 + gi(u˜i(k)− φ(θi(k)))2 (4)
where φ(.) is a common for all agents continuous trans-
formation matching each opinion to a desired outcome. The
constant parameters gi are indicating how manipulative each
agent is. That is because the first term of the cost function
(ui(k)−φ(θi(k)))2 indicates the self-consistency of the agent,
ie how close her action is to her opinion, while the second
term (u˜i−φ(θi(k)))2 indicates the manipulative/opportunistic
ends of the agent, i.e. how much she cares to affect the social
outcome through her action so as to bring it close to her
desirable outcome. So the parameters gi determine the ratio
between self-consistent and manipulative behaviour for each
agent.
Assuming that the agents choose their actions rationally
based on their criteria we seek for the Nash equilibrium
solution in each stage of the game. In fact, we deal with a
repeated game rather than a dynamic game since the structure
of the criteria remain the same in each stage of the game and
we don’t examine any aggregative or discounted criteria. So,
each stage of the game consists itself a static game, where the
players are assumed to choose their actions so as to achieve
a Nash equilibrium. These actions derive from the solution of
the following system of equations:{∂Jai
∂ui
= 0
}
(5)
The action dynamics of each agent in the context of the
examined stagewise Nash strategy profile are derived form the
system of equations 5:
∂Jai
∂ui
= 0⇒ 2(ui(k)− φ(θi(k)))
+ 2gi
(∑
j∈Ni uj(k − 1) + ui(k)
di + 1
− φ(θi(k))
)
1
di + 1
= 0
solving these equations with respect to ui(k) and shifting the
time index k to k+1 for presentation coherence:
ui(k + 1) =
(
1 +
digi
gi + (di + 1)2
)
φ(θi(k + 1))
− gi
gi + (di + 1)2
∑
j∈Ni
uj(k) (6)
Defining now the diagonal matrices
Gθ = diag
{
1 +
digi
gi + (di + 1)2
}
(7)
and
Gu = diag
{ gi
gi + (di + 1)2
}
(8)
we rewrite the equation 6 in matrix form:
u(k + 1) = GθΦ(θ(k + 1))−GuAu(k) (9)
where u(k) = [u1(k)...un(k)]T and Φ(θ(k + 1)) =
[φ(θ1(k + 1))...φ(θn(k + 1))]
T .
III. STABILITY ANALYSIS
A. Known results on opinion dynamics
For the evolution of the opinions of the agents we consider
the following dynamics:
θi(k + 1) =
ci
di + ci
θi(k) +
1
di + ci
∑
j∈Ni
θj(k) (10)
which can be summarized using matrix notation to the follow-
ing expression:
θ(k + 1) = (D + C)−1(A+ C)θ(k) (11)
where θ(k) = [θ1(k)...θn(k)]T and (D + C)−1(A + C) is a
matrix with its rows summing to the unit (like a stochastic
matrix) and thus a stable one , so θ(k) converges to a
limit distribution θc which is actually a consensus on each
connected subgraph. For some results on these the reader could
study [1] and for a more general description one could study
4the criteria summarised in [17], which are satisfied in our case.
So the following statements hold:
‖θ(k + 1)− θ(k)‖ → 0 (12)
‖θ(k)− θc‖ → 0 (13)
Remark III.1. It is easy to observe that the parameters cidi+ci ,
describing the resistance of each agent to adopt new ideas,
affect the rate of convergence. Specifically, as cidi+ci increases
the matrix A tends to approximate the identity matrix so its
eigenvalues tend to be on the unit circle and the rate of
convergence decreases.
B. Stability analysis of the coupled opinion and action dy-
namics
We continue our analysis by considering the augmented
vector z(k) = [θ1(k)...θn(k), u1(k)...un(k)]T and the re-
sulting augmented system describing its dynamics. For sim-
plicity reasons of the presentation we will use the notation
Φ ◦ (D +C)−1(A+C)θ(k) to denote the nonlinear function
Φ(θ(k + 1)) . So we obtain the following dynamics:
z(k + 1) =
[
(D + C)−1(A+ C) 0
GθΦ ◦ (D + C)−1(A+ C) −GuA
]
z(k)
(14)
1) A decoupling lemma:
Lemma III.2. If the matrix Au = GuA is asymptotically
stable, ie |λi(Au)| < 1,∀i and the function Φ is continuous
in Rn and locally Lipschitz in a neighborhood of θc with a
Lipschitz constant LΦ, then the coupled dynamics (14) will be
stable.
Proof. For the opinion dynamics, θ(k + 1) = Aθθ(k), it is
known to be stable as we have already discussed in a previous
section. So, ∃K : ∀k > K θ(k) belongs to a neighborhood
of θc where the mapping Φ is Lipschitz. Thus ∀k > K the
following holds for the actions:
‖u(k + 1)− u(k)‖ =
‖GθΦ(θ(k + 1))−Auu(k)−GθΦ(θ(k)) +Auu(k − 1)‖
≤ ‖GθΦ(θ(k + 1))−GθΦ(θ(k))‖+ ‖Auu(k)−Auu(k − 1)‖
≤ LΦ‖Gθ‖‖θ(k + 1)− θ(k)‖+ ‖Au‖‖u(k)− u(k − 1)‖
(15)
let now α = ‖Au‖ < 1 by our hypothesis that Au is
asymptotically stable, δk = LΦ‖Gθ‖‖θ(k + 1) − θ(k)‖ → 0
due to (12) and xk = ‖u(k)− u(k − 1)‖ thus we rewrite the
previous inequality:
xk+1 ≤ axk + δk (16)
with a < 1 and δk1−a → 0. So this inequality satisfy the
conditions of lemma 3, p.45 of [30] and consequently it
converges to zero, thus the sequence ‖u(k + 1) − u(k)‖ is
convergent to zero, so the sequence u(k) is Cauchy and thus
convergent to an equilibrium point. So finally, the coupled
dynamics are stable.
The usefulness of this lemma arises form the fact that the
opinion dynamics are stable for every graph structure as the
matrix Aθ = (D + C)−1(A + C) has the desired properties
for every adjacency matrix A and its degree matrix D. So this
lemma enables us to focus on the stabilization of the action
dynamics, through the graph design and the consequent tuning
of the matrix Au, guaranteeing that the coupled dynamics will
remain stable for every such design.
2) A sufficient condition: From the previous lemma and the
substitution GuA = Gu(D + I)(D + I)−1A we can derive
the following simple stability condition.
The matrix (D + I)−1A is a substochastic matrix, ie its
rows have sum equal or less than one, thus as shown in
[13] its spectral radius ρ((D + I)−1A) = max{‖λi((D +
I)−1A)‖, i = 1...N} is less than one, so this matrix is stable.
So, a simple but restrictive sufficient condition for the sta-
bility of the whole system is the spectral radius of Gu(D+I),
ρ(Gu(D + I)) = max{‖λi(Gu(D + I))‖, i = 1...N} to be
less than one as well or equivalently
(di + 1)gi
gi + (di + 1)2
≤ 1⇒ gi ≤ di + 2,∀i (17)
Remark III.3. We state this simple observation here because
we can exploit its simplicity to use it as a heuristic for a
stable topology design. That is, since this condition guar-
antees that the coupled dynamics converge on a graph with
min{di} ≥ max{gi}−2 we know that a ring lattice of degree
d1 = dmax{gi} − 2eeven is a topology that stabilizes these
dynamics.
C. Simulations on the model’s stability properties
Several illustrative examples are presented here. On the one
hand, the stability properties of the coupled dynamics proven
in the previous section will be verified through the presentation
of suitable examples on different graph structures. On the other
hand, some observations will be pointed, that motivated us to
formulate a general topology design problem.
In the following simulations we consider a network of
n = 20 agents participating in a repeated social choice
procedure for T = 100 times. The parameters ci indicating the
obstinateness of the agents are randomly chosen from the in-
terval [10, 100]. The parameters gi indicating the manipulative
tendencies of the agents are randomly chosen from the interval
[0, 15]. Their initial opinions are randomly chosen from the
[0, 10] interval. Their initial actions are the desired ones
according to their initial opinions ui(0) = φ(θi(0)), where
the function Φ is considered to be Φ(θ) = 10tanh(θ/10),
which is both continuous and locally Lipschitz.
Firstly, we present the convergent opinion and action dy-
namics Fig:2 on a realization of a random graph [24] with
edge probability p = 0.4 Fig:1, which in the presented case
has |E| = 81 edges and the spectral radius of the resulting
matrix Au equals λmax{Au} = 0.7774, so it has the necessary
stability properties.
Subsequently, a case of nonconvergent dynamics will be
presented. The dynamics Fig:4 result from a realization of a
random graph with edge probability p = 0.3 Fig:3, which has
|E| = 54 edges and λmax{Au} = 1.0418.
5Figure 1: A random graph with edge probability p=0.4.
Figure 2: Opinion and action dynamics on a random graph
with edge probability p = 0.4.
Figure 3: A random graph with edge probability p=0.3.
Figure 4: Opinion and unstable action dynamics on a random
graph with edge probability p = 0.3 .
We consider now the problem of choosing a proper graph
structure, which would result in stable dynamics and be as
close as possible to the aforementioned unstable one with
respect to the edge number |E| in this case. We make several
experiments beginning from an L∗-lattice which satisfies our
sufficient condition (L∗ > gmax−2), L∗ = 14 in this example,
and relaxing it by considering lattices of smaller node degree
until the dynamics become unstable, as shown in table I.
In Fig:5 is depicted an example of a lattice graph of degree
Graph structure λmax(Au) |E|
L∗-lattice 0.4042 140
8-lattice 0.7758 80
6-lattice 1.0114 60
Small-world 0.9491 60
Table I: Stability of several graph structures
8.
Figure 5: A lattice graph of node degree 8.
The most interesting observation we made from our exper-
iments was that while the 6 degree lattice results in unstable
dynamics if we rewire some of its edges and thus create a
small world graph, as introduced by J. Watts and S.Strogatz
(1998), the dynamics become stable. This indicates that a
well structured topology -whose properties can be studied
analytically- is not necessarily a best choice for our problem,
on the opposite the introduction of some random rewirings
results in better structures. This was a motivation for the
following general formulation of the topology design problem
and the avoidance of restrictions on several special classes of
topologies.
The small world graph is presented in Fig:6 and the stable
dynamics resulting from this structure are presented in Fig:7.
Figure 6: A small-world graph, derived from a 6-lattice with
rewiring probability pr = 0.5 .
IV. NETWORK TOPOLOGY DESIGN FOR THE
STABILIZATION OF THE ACTION DYNAMICS
A. Notation and Problem statement
For the graph topology design we will consider the vector
x ∈ {0, 1}n(n−1)/2, which denotes the occurrence of a change
in the existing graph structure and constitutes our decision
variables.
6Figure 7: Opinion and action dynamics on a small world graph
resulting form a 6-lattice.
Let {P k, k = 1...n(n+1)2 } be a basis of the symmetric n×n
matrices. Specifically, consider the matrices P k with P kij =
P kji = 1 if i = maxm≥0{
∑m−1
l=1 (n − (l − 1)) ≤ k} and
j = i − 1 + k −∑i−1l=1(n − (l − 1)) and P kij = 0 elsewhere.
The diagonal matrices of this basis, ie {P k : k ∈ Kd =
{∑i−1l=1(n− (l− 1)) + 1, i = 1...n}}, we will denote them P id
since each k ∈ Kd corresponds to an i ∈ {1...n}.
Now with this notation we can write A0 =∑
k/∈Kd x0(k)P
k, where the vector x0 stands for the
coordinates of A0 with respect to the aforementioned basis
{P k, k = 1...n(n+1)2 } except its diagonal elements whose
coordinates are all zero. It is profound that x0(k) ∈ {0, 1}.
The topology design procedure consists of the addition of
some new edges and the removal of some existing edges. So
we define the following sign function Sx0(k) = 1 if x0(k) = 0
and Sx0(k) = −1 if x0(k) = 1, which multiplied with the
vector of changes x indicates which changes correspond to an
addition of an edge and which to a removal.
So the adjacency matrix of the graph depends linearly on
the changes’ vector x:
A(x) = A0 +
n(n−1)/2∑
k=1
x(k)P kSx0(k) (18)
and the degree matrix changes accordingly:
D(x) =
n∑
i=1
ei(A(x)1)
TP id (19)
which is also a linear function of x.
Subsequently, we define the matrix functions:
Gu(x) = G(G+ (D(x) + I)
2)−1 (20)
and
Au(x) = Gu(x)A(x) (21)
which are nonlinear with respect to the decision variables x.
Applying the Lyapunov stability criterion on the matrix
Au(x) = Gu(x)A(x) we obtain the following matrix inequal-
ity for P > 0 and x:
A(x)Gu(x)PGu(x)A(x)− P ≤ Q (22)
The matrix Q is a negative definite matrix, for example
Q = −qI, where q is a design parameter affecting the
stability properties of the system as well as the size of the
feasible region of the optimisation problem. In the simulations
presented in the next section this parameter is considered very
small (q∼ 10−2).
Let the Fx = {x : ∃P > 0 : A(x)Gu(x)PGu(x)A(x) −
P ≤ −qI}. This set contains all the feasible designs, ie
the vectors x for witch the induced graph described by the
adjacency matrix A(x) has the desired stability properties.
In order to choose an element of the aforementioned feasible
set as a best design, we consider the criterion of the minimum
change from the initial graph structure, which is a natural cri-
terion as especially on graphs representing social interactions
it may be very difficult to persuade someone to abandon a
friend or make a new one. So we consider the minimization
of ‖x‖1, which is equivalent to the minimization of the linear
objective 1Tx. The resulting problem is:
minimize
x,P
{1Tx} (23)
x ∈ {0, 1}n(n−1)/2 (24)
∃P > 0 : A(x)Gu(x)PGu(x)A(x)− P ≤ −qI
(25)
In this problem formulation several linear constraints may be
added so as to describe restrictions on the design parameters
due to special structural characteristics of the network, which
may be important to be preserved or due to special characteris-
tics of several nodes, whose neighborhood cannot be affected.
However, these extra constraints do not increase the difficulty
of the problem as it lies on the constraint (25).
This constraint ∃P > 0 : A(x)Gu(x)PGu(x)A(x) − P ≤
−qI is nonlinear in the decision variables x. Furthermore,
considering the change of variables Z = Gu(x)PGu(x) we
obtain the equivalent constraint:
∃Z > 0 : A(x)ZA(x)−G−1u (x)ZG−1u (x) ≤ −qI (26)
This last constraint (26) is polynomial in the decision variables
x and since x(k) ∈ {0, 1} → (x(k))n = x(k)∀n there exists a
proper change of variables (y(m) = x(k)x(l)∀k, l and w(n) =
y(m)zij∀m, i, j) which transforms (26) to a Bilinear Matrix
Inequality (BMI). The feasibility of a BMI is known to be a
nonconvex problem in its general case [23], so the same holds
for our initial problem (23)-(25).
B. A genetic algorithm for the topology design problem
We now present the genetic algorithm developed to obtain
a feasible solution for the nonconvex integer programming
problem (23)-(25). In order to avoid the explosion of the
dimensionality which results to a very slow convergence for
the genetic algorithm, we use the genetic algorithm to search
only in the space of the decision variables x rather than
in the whole space (x,P). However, this search may lead to
several topologies which will not satisfy the constraint (25).
To deal with this we observe that the constraint (25) is linear
with respect to the matrix variable P, so its feasibility can be
efficiently checked with the use of a projective method based
algorithm for Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs). So, for each
new topology produced by the genetic operations we check its
feasibility with an LMI solver and we drop it out of the next
7generation if it is infeasible. The basic characteristics of this
algorithm are enlisted below:
Chromosomes: Each chromosome of the genetic algorithm
is a 0-1 sequence of length n(n−1)2 representing the vector
x0 + x · Sx0 for some changes’ vector x. The vectors x0, x
and Sx0 are defined in the previous section, while the symbol
”·” denotes elementwise multiplication of the two vectors.
Initial population: As initial population for the genetic
algorithm we consider a specific number of feasible random
perturbations of the initial topology x0. That is we produce
a number of chromosomes of the form x0 + x · Sx0 , which
satisfy the constraint (25), where x are randomly derived 0-1
sequences. The feasibility check, which is described below,
is applied on these chromosomes in order to verify which of
them are satisfying the constraint (25) and reject the others
from the initial population.
Fitness function: The fitness function of the ge-
netic algorithm coincides with the objective function of
the problem (23)-(25), so it has the following form
fitness(chromosome) = ‖chromosome − x0‖1 = ‖x0 +
x · Sx0 − x0‖1 = ‖x‖1.
Selection: For the choice of a portion of the population for
the breeding of the next generation we use a simple truncation
selection criterion. We choose the 50% fittest part of the
population in the case the size population exceeds a specific
lower bound or we hold the whole population if its size is
smaller than this lower bound. The reason for this is to avoid
the diminishment of the population in the case that many
new offsprings are rejected because they do not satisfy the
constraints. The next generation of the population is initialised
by the selected part of the previous population.
The truncation selection has the drawback that it may lead
to elitism, and thus the algorithm may converge to a local
minimum of the optimisation problem, but the convergence
speed of the algorithm if we use another selection procedure,
such as fitness proportionate selection, is much more slow,
so we have kept this simple method for our experimental
simulations. Moreover, by choosing our initial conditions
relatively close to the optimum - we initialise the algorithm
with perturbations of the initial infeasible topology which are
adequately close to it and feasible - we enhance our chances
to find the global optimum even with this selection procedure.
Of course, in cases of practical interest where great accuracy
is needed and with sufficient computing power available, we
can easily replace this subroutine by one applying fitness
proportionate selection.
Crossover: The crossover operator considered here chooses
randomly two parents form the selected portion of the popu-
lation and chooses also randomly a crossover point between
1...n(n−1)2 and produces two offsprings form the two possible
combinations of the parent chromosomes around this point.
Mutation: The mutation operator applied to an offspring
changes each of its bits with probability pm = 2n(n−1) ,
resulting on an average change of one bit per chromosome.
Feasibility check: After the production of the new off-
springs with the application of the genetic operators, each
offspring is checked for the feasibility of the constraint (25).
For this we use an LMI solver, which uses a projective method
algorithm, to examine the existence of a matrix P > 0 which
satisfies the LMI (25), where the matrices A(x) and Gu(x)
have the fixed values corresponding to the vector x of the
offspring’s chromosome x0 + x · Sx0 . If this LMI is found
feasible the new chromosome is added to the next generation,
else it is rejected.
Termination criterion: The genetic algorithm terminates
after a specified number of generations N. The fittest chro-
mosome of the last generation is returned as solution for our
topology design problem.
Figure 8: Genetic algorithm flowchart.
C. Simulations of the results of the genetic algorithm
In the following simulations we consider a network of
n = 20 agents participating in a repeated social choice
procedure for T = 300 times. The parameters ci are chosen
randomly from the interval [10, 100]. The parameters gi are
randomly chosen form the interval [0, 10]. The function Φ
which maps the opinions to the desired actions is considered
to be Φ(θ) = 10tanh(θ/10), which is both continuous and
locally Lipschitz. The initial opinions θi(0) are randomly
chosen from the interval [0, 10] and the initial actions are
the ones corresponding to these opinions ui(0) = φ(θi(0)).
All the aforementioned parameters remain the same in both
simulations.
The initial graph topology is the realisation of a random
graph with edge probability p = 0.2 shown in figure Fig:9.
The resulting opinion and action dynamics are shown in
figure Fig:10, where we can see that the action dynamics are
unstable.
Applying the genetic algorithm presented in the previous
section to the initial graph topology we obtain the graph
topology presented in figure Fig:11, which differs from the
initial one only on three edges.
The resulting opinion and action dynamics are shown in
figure Fig:12, where we can see that the action dynamics are
stable over the designed graph topology.
8Figure 9: The initial graph topology, derived as a random graph
with edge probability p = 0.2.
Figure 10: Unstable action dynamics on the initial graph
topology.
Figure 11: The designed graph topology by the genetic algo-
rithm.
Figure 12: Stable action dynamics on the designed graph
topology.
Comments: As we can easily observe from the simulations
above the graph topology that derived from the genetic algo-
rithm results in stable action dynamics, so it is a feasible point
of our optimisation problem. Moreover, with respect to its
optimality, we have already pointed that the designed topology
differs from the initial one on just 3 edges (specifically 1
edge has been removed and 2 new edges have been added),
meaning that ‖x‖1 = 3 which is very small. It may be
a suboptimal solution (even if it seems unlikely to find a
topology even closer to the initial one resulting in stable
dynamics), but in most cases it might be an acceptable design.
Finally, compared with the heuristic approaches developed in
section 4.3 it outperforms them by far, since the best we had
achieved there was a difference of 8 on the amount, not on
the exact location, of the existing edges of the two topologies,
while now we achieved a difference of 3 on the exact location
of the edges of the two topologies.
D. Simulations over Special Structured Initial Topologies
In the following simulations we consider a network of n =
20 agents and we check just the structure of the resulting
topologies after the implementation of the genetic algorithm
on several special structured initial topologies. The parameters
gi indicating the manipulative tendencies of the agents are
chosen accordingly in each case in order to make the initial
topology resulting in unstable dynamics.
Figure 13: Initial ring topology
Figure 14: Designed unconnected topology from a
ring(optimal)
1) Ring: For the ring topology Fig:13 the parameters
gi indicating the manipulative tendencies of the agents are
chosen randomly from the interval [0, 10]. The ring is a very
sparse structure for a connected one. It has only 20 edges
while 19 are needed in order to be connected. Furthermore,
its stability properties are not very enhanced - even small
manipulative parameters result in instabilities. So a connected
stable topology differs a lot from the initial one. That’s why
our algorithm returns an unconnected topology as the optimal
solution Fig:14. This topology has 5 edges and differs from the
initial one on 15 edges. The unconnected designed topology
9Figure 15: Designed connected topology from a ring
is stable, since the isolation of the agents pauses their social
interactions and results in the preservation of their initial
opinions and actions, which are stable by the time they are
not increasing.
Even if it is mathematically acceptable, the isolation of the
agents is a bit unrealistic and in many cases undesirable design.
Subsequently, we add a simple linear constraint in the topology
design problem demanding the designed topology to have at
least 19 edges -the minimum edges needed to be connected.
Interestingly, we obtain a connected topology Fig:15, which
has 39 edges and differs from the initial one on 20 edges.
Figure 16: Initial 4-lattice topology
Figure 17: Designed topology from 4-lattice
2) 4-lattice: For the 4-lattice Fig:16 the parameters gi
indicating the manipulative tendencies of the agents are cho-
sen randomly from the interval [0, 20]. This increase in the
manipulation parameters shows from the beginning that the
lattices have enhanced stability properties in comparison with
the ring, as it is expected since they are more dense and well
connected topologies. The 4-lattice depicted in Fig:16 has 40
edges. Our design results in the topology Fig:17 which has 43
edges and differs from the initial one on 5 edges.
Figure 18: Initial star topology
Figure 19: Designed unconnected topology from a star (opti-
mal)
Figure 20: Designed connected topology from a star
3) Star: For the star topology Fig:18 the parameters gi
indicating the manipulative tendencies of the agents are chosen
randomly from the interval [0, 20], except the one of the
central node which is chosen much larger (here g(1) = 70).
That is because the star structure is a very robust one with
respect to its stability properties, since the central node is
very difficult to manipulate and to be manipulated as she has
the most neighbors she could have. So the parameters should
be chosen large enough in order to arise instabilities on this
initial topology. Moreover, the star graph has the least possible
edges needed to be connected (19 edges), so it seems to be
a very robust design for the number of its edges. That is
the reason why our algorithm converges to an unconnected
topology Fig:19 which is closer to the star topology than any
connected stable one. It has only 3 edges and it differs form
the initial topology on 18 edges. It shall be noted here that,
as in the case of the ring, the unconnected designed topology
is stable.
Subsequently, as in the case of the ring topology, we add
an extra constraint for the topology to enhance a connected
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design and we derive the final topology depicted in Fig:20. It
has 47 edges and it differs from the initial one on 42 edges.
Figure 21: Initial random graph topology for identical agents
Figure 22: Designed topology for identical agents
4) Identical Agents: In the final simulation the agents are
considered to be identical with respect to their subjective char-
acteristics. So, the parameters gi indicating their manipulative
tendencies are chosen to be the same and equal to 10. The
parameters c(i) affecting the convergence of the opinions are
also chosen to be the same and equal to 100 (this affects only
the rate of convergence of the dynamics not their stability). As
initial topology a random graph with edge probability p0 = 0.3
and 34 edges is considered Fig:21. Our design results in the
topology of Fig:22, which has 52 edges and differs from the
initial on 20 edges.
We note here that since the agents are identical and the
stability of the action dynamics does not depend on their initial
conditions any permutation of the agents on the designed
structure is also stable. The resulting depicted position of them
in Fig:22 is the closest design to the initial topology Fig:21
according to our agent based design. It is interesting to observe
that even if the agents are identical the designed topology
is not symmetric. Surely, there exist symmetric topologies
that are stable, for example see remark III.3, but they are
not close to the initial topology with respect to our metric.
Moreover, we should point that in this case of identical agents,
if permutations are permitted i.e. we do not care who is
who, our agent based criterion is not a proper metric for the
distance between graph topologies and there may exist another
topology more similar to the initial unstable one with respect
to some proper graph similarity metric, which our algorithm
cannot find.
Comments: From the study of these special structures we
deduce several interesting conclusions. At first, the isolation
of some agents form the rest network is sometimes optimal
as it effectively stops their manipulative activity. The fact is
that such a design will not be acceptable by these agents nor
it may be socially acceptable. So we add more constraints
which do not affect the difficulty of the problem in order to
avoid a design which may be optimal but inapplicable in social
networks. Fortunately, since the increase of the agent’s friends
leads to the decrease of her ability to manipulate each one
of them, as we deduce from the sufficient condition 17, it is
guaranteed that there exists another topology with more edges
than the initial, which satisfies the stability constraints and it
is in fact a local minimum of our optimisation problem. We
can also design this topology to be connected by adding more
edges and not affecting its stability.
Secondly, we observe the stability properties of the dynam-
ics induced by some very simple and useful topologies as the
ring and the star. It worths to be mentioned that these two
topologies, despite having almost the same number of edges,
the induced dynamics have totally different stability properties,
since in the ring just a small amount of manipulative behavior
can lead to instabilities, while the star topology is extremely
robust with respect to the manipulative behavior needed to
raise instabilities.
Finally, these special cases are useful as test cases for
the functionality our algorithm and indeed the last one with
the identical agents indicates a vulnerability of our agent
based formulation and the respective graph distance in the
case where the agents are identical and their names do not
matter. Nevertheless, in most existing social networks each
node stands for a specific agent who chooses his neighborhood
and thus this anonymity and position insignificancy case does
not occur.
V. CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE EXTENSIONS
In this work we considered a social choice procedure as
a repeated Nash game between social agents communicating
over a social network. A contribution of this work is an
enrichment of the model for social choice procedures proposed
in [16] by considering dynamically changing opinions and thus
resulting in second order dynamics. However, our basic nov-
elty is a new approach for the stabilization of these dynamics
through the graph topology design, which results in an integer
programming problem with nonconvex constraints. Finally, we
designed a proper genetic algorithm for this problem.
However, there exist several possible alternatives to deal
with this problem, such as simulated annealing or particle
swarm optimization algorithms, which may be part of our
future work. Moreover, the study of some special cases of
the topology design problem, restricted on some subset of
admissible topologies where the detection of an exact solution
may become possible, is an interesting future direction of our
research. Except for that direction, it would be interesting to
verify or reject our model’s features and assumptions by the
use of real data from some social experiments or polls and
evolve the model so as to describe better the specific social
phenomena.
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